


USE CASE

authUSB SafeDoor

Strategic and Essential sectors



What is the specific problem of the Strategic and Essential Services regarding the traffic of USB Flash Drives?

The Strategic Services, are composed of each of the different areas within the labor, economic and productive activity, which provide an essential service or guarantee the exercise of the authority of the State or the security of the country.

Essential service: This is the service necessary for the maintenance of the basic social functions, health, safety, social and economic welfare of citizens, or the efficient operation of State institutions and public administrations.

Although there is a huge range of diverse sectors, they all have in common that any type of cyber attack, as far as we are concerned, through USB Flash Drives, (both internal ones and by third

parties) would result in damage ,not only of an economic nature but could also affect factors that are extremely harmful to citizens.

We are faced with services that are especially greedy, for the data they handle, for a cyber attack. The type of threats that occur here are always directed and perfectly prepared.

Controlling access by this type of USB Flash Drive to the installations of these services is essential.

The disabling of USB ports by this type of strategic service, in addition to being unfeasible in the majority of cases, does not mean that a cyber-attack cannot also take place through them. Hw and electrical attacks are equally viable in this case. This type of threats are also undetectable, persistent over time and in the majority of cases irreversible.

What does SafeDoor provide?

SafeDoor is a solution that analyses, protects and detects attacks via USB devices. It acts as a barrier between these and the computer equipment of an organization, taking action against the three attack vectors:

- **Electric:** It continually monitors the behaviour of the USB device at the electrical level, identifying and halting attacks by overvoltage of the usbKiller type.
- **Hardware:** It continually monitors the behaviour of the USB device at the hardware level, spotting and deactivating attacks from the BadUsb family, HID threats (rubber ducky and similar ones), false network cards, complex interfaces, etc.
- **Software:** With an integrated antivirus motor (compatible with various manufacturers) with which it carries out an analysis previous to the download or transfer of any content.

The behaviour of the USB device is monitored at all times until the extraction, avoiding in this way attacks activated via time or the number of connections, which would have passed unnoticed in an initial analysis. Because of these reasons, amongst others, a foreign USB device never should be directly connected to the organization's equipment.

In addition to the protection of the system, it also offers audition and traceability of all the connected devices and the analyzed files.

How does SafeDoor fit into our working scheme?

Given the wide variety of cases that can occur in the different sectors that make up these strategic sectors, we will divide them into two blocks trying to expose in each of them where to put the focus on the use of SafeDoor.

SECTORS WITHOUT MANUFACTURING

1. IMPLEMENTATION IN TOP MANAGEMENT:

SafeDoor connected directly to Top Management computer equipment, acting as a single point of entry for any USB storage device. It also prevents that any type of information can be extracted by this means without previous authorization. In this case, this extraction is audited through the Central Console, consigning who, how, when and where it takes place.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS AND OFFICES:

Connected to the network, SafeDoor gives service to each department or office. This means that any USB device used is not connected directly to any USB port within the organization. SafeDoor allows the logging of the input of such devices.

For shared use by different users, the system supports the explicit reservation of each of the USB ports, so that the confidentiality of the contents is guaranteed.

In all cases the implementation of SafeDoor prevents the extraction of internal information from the organization through USB storage devices. There is the possibility of allowing this, under a strict protocol and with the appropriate permissions in each organization, always remaining this movement audited in the Central Console.

SECTORS WITH MANUFACTURING

1. ACCESS CONTROLS

Fully autonomous and automated installation of SafeDoor (Only connected to the Electrical network) Through the built-in LEDs, SafeDoor tells us whether the connected device is safe or not, performing the scanning at the three types of threats. (HW, SW and electrical)

2. “FRONTERA- FRONTERA/ADUANA” USE

FRONTERA

This model allows for the dumping of the content of an untrustworthy external device in an internal trustworthy inventoried device that is authorized for its later connection to the internal equipment of the organization. In this way it is guaranteed that there will not be HW or electric threats and that the contents have been analysed via antivirus, providing traceability of all the files interchanged via USB.

Two different types of dedication can be given as a Frontera team:

-Automated: the scanning is carried out in a totally automatic way, both firmware and of the whole of the files contained in the USB device.

-Interactive: The check is made at Hw and Electric level and, through the web console of SafeDoor, we can choose those files that we want to analyse before downloading them.

FRONTERA/ADUANA

This model allows for the upholding of the Airgap between IT/OT networks or networks with different levels of safety rating. At the same time it also maintains the tracking of folders introduced via an internal network.

The SafeDoor equipment that is located in the internal network, will only accept inventoried USB devices that previously must be scanned by the external SafeDoor. This last one will create a digitally signed folder with a list of files ,scanned and authorized, in the inventoried USB device. During this process, the internal SafeDoor will guarantee, with a previous verification of the digital signature, that only these files are transferred. With this model, the antivirus updates for the internal SafeDoor (a laborious process in isolated networks) are no longer necessary, even when interchanging information between networks located in several sites.

3.-REMOTE TRANSFER

This model allows for a secure transfer of files to a remote location through the central console, download and dump in an inventoried USB device.

Specially designed for maintenance operations and remote configuration, it makes available to the technical experts the necessary files for its activity in a specific location. This way ensures the confidentiality, traceability, integrity and security of the information, as well as the probate of the process minimizing the possibility of human error.

SafeDoor allows the use of Encrypted USB devices at a HW level ,wich we strongly recommend, (DataLocker, Iron Key) and also Bitlocker and Luks encrypted devices
SafeDoor also includes the possibility of using digital signature of the files that are downloaded to ensure its integrity.
The traceability of the processes is total.

FAQ:

1.-Maximum number of antiviruses embeded on SafeDoor*

Safe Door supports up to two simultaneous antivirus complete engines.

*We can integrate more than two if necessary

2.-Way to update antiviruses.

There are three methods of updating signatures, depending on your environment:

- **Direct.**
- **Indirect.**
- **Offline.**

Scan levels to run (fast, full, selective,.) As soon as a memory is connected to safeDoor, hardware and electrical analysis is performed automatically. This

analysis is very fast, just two seconds, although it continues to be continuously monitored until it is extracted. As for software scanning (antivirus) there are two modes of use:

- **Manual:** From a web browser, the user selects the files/folders to download. On these selected files, analysis is carried out by the antivirus (selective analysis)
- **Automatic:** Anti-virus scanners all the contents of the memory reporting through LEDs progress and result. No need to access the web interface, the computer is autonomous (full analysis)

It is also possible to modify the default settings of antivirus engines (maximum size, depth levels in compressed files, extensions to be scanned...)

3.-Average USB scanning time.

The scanning time is similar to that of a desktop computer, since the bottleneck is at the reading speed of the USBstick. With modern memory read speeds of about 35 MB/s can be achieved, while with advertising memories or degraded by usage the speed can drop to 15/20 MB/s.

4.-Log storage: device, console?


Each of the events that take place in the safedoor devices are reflected in the Central Console

- It receives the audit reports (detailed registry of the devices and files analyzed) digitally signed via the SafeDoor through an HTTPs channel.
- Through the same channel it provides firmware updates and automatic setup for all the SafeDoors. If needed it can also act as a mirror of the latest antivirus updates.
- Embeddable with an external SIEM via syslog.
- It offers a web interface to the administrators for the interaction with the system.
-

5.-Maximum number of devices to manage from a central console

It is scalable depending on the hardware or configuration of the virtual machine on which you run. With 2 cores /16GB RAM 50 linked devices are supported.

6.-Central console screens



The screenshot shows the authUSB console interface. The main table lists several files detected as infected. Below the table, the details for the selected file 'ArdamaxKeylogger' are displayed.

usbBox	Archivo	Descripción	Dirección	Fecha
usbBox000040	eciar.com	Infected	INPUT	2019/06/16 13:36:21
usbBox000039	eciar.com	Infected	INPUT	2019/06/15 22:02:46
usbBox000039	win32.exe	Infected	INPUT	2019/05/23 21:50:03
usbBox000039	wamacy.exe	Infected	INPUT	2019/05/23 21:50:03
usbBox000039	ArdamaxKeylogger	Infected	INPUT	2019/05/23 21:50:03
usbBox000039	eciar.com	Infected	INPUT	2019/05/23 21:50:03
usbBox000039	win32.exe	Infected	INPUT	2019/05/23 21:46:12
usbBox000039	ed01ebfc9eb5bba545f4d021f5f1071661840480439c9e5babe0e090e41aa.exe	Infected	INPUT	2019/05/23 21:46:12
usbBox000039	ArdamaxKeylogger_E33AF9E602CBB7AC3634C2608150DD18	Infected	INPUT	2019/05/23 21:46:12


Detalles:

Dispositivo: USB2.0/Flash Disk
 Ruta: /Keylogger/Ardamax/ArdamaxKeylogger_E33AF9E602CBB7AC3634C2608150DD18
 SHA1: 6f5ec9c137822bc1d8f139c35f6c3b647ce3fe
 SHA256: 6d970e0c48b0ee1aca1f0c53c9a82aaada837197708a70321138da8b6b75
 Tipo: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 60386, for MS Windows
 Tamaño: 802724 bytes
 F. Creación: 2019/05/23 19:43:51
 F. Acceso: 2019/05/23 02:00:00
 F. Modificación: 2019/06/06 16:22:30

Resultado global del análisis:

AV: Global
 Cod. Resultado: 1
 Desc. Resultado: Infected
 Amenaza: Win32/KeyLogger/Ardamax.NBB.application

clean file capture



The screenshot shows the authUSB console interface. The main table lists several files detected as clean. Below the table, the details for the selected file 'GStreamer 1.0-devel-x86-1.12.4.msi' are displayed.

usbBox	Archivo	Descripción	Dirección	Fecha
usbBox000040	sdhrt.cdf	Clean	INPUT	2019/06/16 13:34:55
usbBox000040	ace.fr	Clean	INPUT	2019/06/16 13:34:55
usbBox000040	access.pcx	Clean	INPUT	2019/06/16 13:34:55
usbBox000040	ab.r	Clean	INPUT	2019/06/16 13:34:55
usbBox000040	aa.r	Clean	INPUT	2019/06/16 13:34:55
usbBox000040	18x16.fnt	Clean	INPUT	2019/06/16 13:34:55
usbBox000039	gstreamer-1.0-devel-x86-1.12.4.msi	Clean	INPUT	2019/06/15 22:04:08


Detalles:

Dispositivo: USB/Disk 2.0
 Ruta: /gstreamer-1.0-devel-x86-1.12.4.msi
 SHA1: bbaf633b159a366f69002351cf14d93a9c41d93
 SHA256: 6136a25383fc1918a3fbed46e950fa5c00038d403a712921e93b015ce9d60
 Tipo: Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 6.2, MSI Installer, Code page: 1252, Title: Installation Database, Subject: GStreamer 1.0 (Development Files), Author: GStreamer Project, Keywords: Installer, Comment: GStreamer 1.0, Template: Intel1033, Revision Number: {03304F06-8983-4A54-B96D-2710E9E8D624}, Create Time/Date: Sat Dec 9 18:30:36 2017, Last Saved Time/Date: Sat Dec 9 18:30:36 2017, Number of Pages: 100, Number of Words: 2, Name of Creating Application: Windows Installer XML (3.5.2519.0), Security: 2
 Tamaño: 129785656 bytes
 F. Creación: 2019/06/12 18:48:23
 F. Acceso: 2019/06/12 02:00:00
 F. Modificación: 2019/04/12 12:55:26

Resultado global del análisis:

AV: Global
 Cod. Resultado: 0
 Desc. Resultado: Clean

sw threat



The screenshot shows the 'authUSB console' interface. It features a sidebar menu on the left with options like 'Panel', 'Usuarios', 'Dispositivos', 'Análisis', and 'Dispositivos USB'. The main area displays a table of USB devices with columns for device ID, manufacturer, type, model, serial number, and timestamp. A 'Detalles' section is expanded for a device, showing fields for 'Fabricante', 'Cod. Fabricante', 'Producto', 'Cod. Producto', and 'Serial'. Below this is a 'Particiones' table with columns for 'Etiqueta', 'Formato', 'Tamaño', and 'Oculta'. At the bottom, there is a pagination bar showing 'Mostrando registros del 76 al 90 de un total de 92 registros' and navigation buttons for 'Anterior' and 'Siguiente'.

ID	Fabricante	Tipo	Modelo	Serie	Fecha
usbBox000037	authUSB	Local Storage			2019/04/29 01:30:39
usbBox000037	Generic	Mass Storage	928825D1		2019/04/29 01:26:19
usbBox000037	authUSB	Local Storage			2019/04/29 01:04:56
usbBox000037	authUSB	Local Storage			2019/04/29 00:48:27
usbBox000037	Generic	Mass Storage	928825D1		2019/04/29 00:47:35
usbBox000037	authUSB	Local Storage			2019/04/29 00:38:50
usbBox000030	Kingston	DataTraveler 3.0	08606E6B6615F296B7233886		2019/04/18 00:21:05
usbBox000030	No a storage device	ATMEL AVR			2019/04/18 00:18:39
usbBox000030	Killer detected (USB2)	USBKILL	USBKiller	0	2019/04/18 00:16:27

Detalles:				
Fabricante:	USBKILL			
Cod. Fabricante:	USBKILL			
Producto:	USBKiller			
Cod. Producto:	USBKiller			
Serial:	0			

Particiones:			
Etiqueta	Formato	Tamaño	Oculta

usbBox000030	authUSB	Local Storage			2019/04/18 00:12:01
usbBox000040	USB2.0	Flash Disk	2019030710210562		2019/01/15 12:12:47
usbBox000040	No a storage device	ATMEL AVR			2019/01/15 12:11:40
usbBox000040	USB2.0	Flash Disk	2019030710210562		2019/01/15 12:09:06
usbBox000040	Killer detected (USB1)	USBKILL	USBKiller	0	2019/01/15 12:06:33

HW threat

7. Download of files

The first and mandatory step to download a file is the Software (antivirus) scan. In case of threat detection in any of the files, in no case will the user be able to download that one specifically. In case the rest of files are free of threats, the user could be able to download them:

- 1) Into the user PC
- 2) Into a USB flash drive connected to SafeDoor
- 3) Into a previously configured folder.